If Ukraine is to hold out against the Russians, it must maintain its soldiers’ capacity to fight effectively and counterattack to reclaim lost ground, argues military analyst JUSTIN BRONK in MailOnline today.
President Volodymyr Zelensky’s troops are mobilising new Ukrainian forces in the west with modern weapons given by Western countries, which may be quickly dispatched to support Odessa or Kyiv if necessary.
Mr. Bronk, a senior military expert in airpower and technology, stressed that Ukraine must maintain army and public morale while ensuring that Western military and other aid continues to flow into the nation.
He went on to say that Russian forces are in a “hazardous position” that is expected to worsen in the next weeks without a big break in hostilities, implying that the Ukrainians must keep fighting.
Mr Bronk, on the other hand, believes the Russians will try one of three alternatives, one of which is to drive north from Melitopol towards Dnipro, meeting a surge southward from Kharkiv at the same time.
The Russians will continue to pound Mariupol, Kharkiv, and other minor cities while aiming to encircle and bypass Mkyolaiv in the south.
He also said parts of Ukraine are ‘now beyond Russia’s capacity to influence or “regain” forever’, adding: ‘Putin now needs his forces to achieve something he can sell to his own people as a victory worth these huge costs.’
Mr. Bronk, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London, has written the following detailed analysis:
On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine with the explicit goal of decapitating the Ukrainian state at both the national and local levels, capturing key cities and infrastructure, and presumably installing a compliant pro-Russian client government to facilitate Ukraine’s de facto absorption into a ‘greater Russia’ alongside Belarus.
Russia’s initial strategy failed due to the strength and reactivity of Ukrainian troops, as well as severely poor planning, morale, and cooperation among Russian forces.
So far, the Russian Army has lost 5,000 to 8,000 troops in battle, with three to four times that number injured, captured, or missing, as well as at least 1,350 vehicles, heavy weapons, and aircraft destroyed or taken.
The number of Ukrainian military casualties is unknown, but they are expected to be in the thousands due to Russia’s overwhelming use of artillery and other heavy firepower along all of their advance axes.
Nonetheless, after three weeks of combat, Russia’s initial goal of toppling Ukraine’s government in Kyiv and replacing it with a client state is no longer feasible.
Since the invasion began, the Russian Army has struggled to make advance in the swampy terrain of Ukraine’s north and northeast. So far, it has been unable to totally encircle and shut off Kyiv or Kharkiv.
Fighting continues outside of Kyiv, at Hostomel, Bucha, Makariv, and Irpin in the northwestern suburbs, and Boryspil and Brovary in the northeastern suburbs.
Ukraine has effectively counterattacked near Kyiv at Chernihiv and Irpin, as well as holding open resupply lines into Kyiv and Kharkiv to the northeast near the Russian border.
It is becoming increasingly evident that the Russian Army will have difficulty assembling enough fighting might to seize Kharkiv, let alone Kyiv.
In addition to the losses already incurred, its resupply convoys have been targeted by Ukrainian light infantry on a regular basis. Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv are being shelled heavily, but Russian attempts to storm besieged cities and towns in the north have been costly and largely ineffective.
Part of the reason for this is that, despite having hundreds of sophisticated fast planes and helicopter gunships, the Russian Air Force has been unable to gain air superiority over most of Ukraine.
The Russian Air Force has been unable to destroy most of Ukraine’s mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems due to a lack of flying hours for pilots to develop their abilities in complex mission sets, limited inventories of contemporary precision guided weapons, and excellent Ukrainian defensive tactics.
As a result, its planes are forced to fly at low altitudes, where SAM systems are less effective, dropping unguided bombs and rockets with limited precision.
By day, they are losing to shoulder-fired anti-aircraft Stinger and Igla missiles at these low altitudes, forcing them to operate at night, where they struggle to detect combat objectives.
Russian soldiers have fared better in the south of Ukraine, where the terrain is more open and the footing is firmer, allowing them to operate more efficiently off-road.
At the commencement of the invasion, the majority of the Ukrainian regular army was stationed along the Donbas line of contact in the country’s east.
Due to intense strikes from the east by separatist and Russian forces, these units have mainly been unable to break contact and support other locations.
The south of Ukraine was always thinly guarded, with most other forces stationed in the north and north-east to defend against attacks on Kyiv and Kharkiv.
As a result, Russian soldiers quickly encircled the vital port city of Mariupol and conquered the cities of Kherson and Melitopol in the first few days of the invasion.
Despite its superiority in the south, the Russian Army has so far been unable to conquer Mariupol despite weeks of intensive shelling. It also failed to take Mykoliav, a tiny city to the north-east of Kherson.
The unprecedented sanctions imposed by NATO, the EU, and many other countries, including Switzerland and Israel, have wreaked havoc on Russia’s finances.
It has squandered its last soft power and global reputation by destroying carefully developed influence networks. Russia is now cut off from much of the world’s air traffic and even several major shipping networks.
Meanwhile, its army is suffering losses in Ukraine that are unsustainable if they go longer than a month or two. In exchange, it has taken a tiny amount of territory in Ukraine’s north, east, and south, but only one big city (Kherson) and a few smaller towns like Melitopol.
Weeks of bombing and battle have already severely damaged or destroyed the other cities it has encircled, including Mariupol, Kharkiv, and Sumy.
Even if Russian troops succeed in compelling them to surrender, they will be left in charge of a partially armed population that is now more united than ever before in its hatred of Russia.
Meanwhile, Russia’s ability to influence or ‘regain’ the rest of Ukraine is no longer viable. Putin’s forces must now achieve something that he can sell to his own people as a victory worth these enormous sacrifices.
Russian soldiers are likely to do three things in this situation.
To begin, they will aim to impair Ukraine’s ability to maintain the current level of warfare by marching north from Melitopol into Dnipro, where they will meet a simultaneous thrust south from Kharkiv.
If this strategy succeeds, the majority of Ukraine’s regular army units in Donbas will be shut off from the rest of the country.
Second, the Russians will continue to shell Mariupol, Kharkiv, and other smaller cities in a violent and indiscriminate manner.
The suffering of their remaining residents and defenders is being used to pressurise the Ukrainian government into agreeing to a ceasefire on terms that would allow Russian forces to pause, consolidate their gains, and rotate those units that have been the most seriously mauled.
Third, Russian forces will continue to try to encircle and bypass Mkyolaiv in the south in order to threaten a drive towards Odessa, Ukraine’s last surviving south-western port city.
In recent days, a Russian Navy task group that has been waiting off the coast of Odessa for weeks has shelled the city and may undertake an amphibious assault if sympathetic ground forces can get near enough.
Meanwhile, attempts to encircle Kyiv will continue, and the city will undoubtedly be bombarded more heavily, although it is exceedingly unlikely to be attacked directly.
The priority for the Ukrainian government will be on maintaining its soldiers’ capacity to fight effectively and counterattacking to reclaim lost territory where possible.
New forces are being rapidly mobilised, trained, and supplied with modern weapons donated by Western countries in western Ukraine.
These will take some time to develop high combat effectiveness, but if needed, they might be despatched to reinforce Odessa or Kyiv quickly.
Meanwhile, the administration must maintain soldier and public morale, as well as ensure that Western military and other help continue to pour into the nation.
Without a big respite in the conflict, Russian soldiers are in a grave situation that will only worsen in the coming weeks.
Continued civilian casualties in Ukraine or severe military setbacks in the east or south, on the other hand, may push the Kyiv government to accept ceasefire terms that would give Russian forces pause without forcing them to retreat from the land they have stolen.
In contrast, if Ukraine is able to keep fighting in the coming weeks, Russia’s military and political situation would become increasingly precarious.
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