Embracing TTP Militants

Islamabad has opened dialogue with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which ever since its formation in December 2007, has carried out a sustained campaign of terror against people of Pakistan and its security institutions and has remained unrepentant over its terrorist activity. Islamabad has thus run the incalculable risk of endangering the gains made by its hard-fought battle against forces of terror.

It is hard to understand the logic behind negotiating with TTP that, amongst other things, carried out a murderous attack on Army Public School in which over 140 students were slaughtered in broad daylight. Add to this the Parade Lane attack in which Army officers and their children were killed. Recently, Islamabad Supreme Court while taking a suo motu notice of the petition filed by the families of the grieving families, summoned Prime Minister Imran Khan and asked the government to provide an answer to the question as to what was its rational for opening a dialogue with TTP?

Lacking a coherent answer, PM Imran Khan could only beat about the bush. Media reports suggest that an armed truce has been agreed between TTP and Islamabad and Siraj Ud Din Haqqani, an interior Minister of the Taliban government, has brokered this agreement. TTP has maintained its organic links with the Taliban movement and it hopes to promote its violent anti-Pakistan agenda by seeking the support of the incumbent Taliban regime that has been in power since August 2020.

Even though details of the Agreement are being kept under wraps, certain things are obvious. TTP’s demands include: release of TTP prisoners being held by Islamabad; removal of the military check posts from former FATA area; cancellation of FATA’s merger with KPK; implementation of the so-called Sharia law. In return for these concessions, TTP has promised to halt its violent campaign against the Pakistani security forces; a dubious claim in view of the almost daily attacks on Pakistani law enforcement institutions by TTP affiliated groups.

On the question of the implementation of this agreement, there is no clarity about whose responsibility it is to enforce it. Islamabad has argued that it does reserve the right to resume its kinetic operations should the agreement falter.

Given the fact that Taliban and the TTP are joined at the hip, it is obvious that it is only for tactical reasons that TTP has approached the Taliban to broker its agreement with Islamabad.

Strategically, TTP wants to gain a measure of legitimacy for itself by posing as an ideological movement that is committed to implementing Sharia law across the Pakistan-Afghan border. TTP wants the removal of Pakistan military check posts,

so that it will have free movement of its fighters across the Pak-Afghan border. Media reports suggest that TTP has its sleeper cells in all the former FATA agencies and it is only a matter of time that they would come out in the open should the interim agreement run into snags.

The larger question that Islamabad needs to pose for itself is: why should Islamabad provide space to a terrorist outfit that has been used by RAW to carry out a destabilization campaign against Pakistan?

With the help of US drone attacks, most of the TTP leadership including its founder Baitullah Mehsud has been decapitated. TTP has not forgiven Islamabad for its enabling the attacks and this violent legacy will continue to cast it dark shadow over all attempts to mainstream TTP into Pakistani politics.

The Pakistani state basically has three options before it in dealing with TTP: a) the Sri Lankan model – continue to treat TTP as a terrorist outfit till it is exterminated; b) the Irish Model –negotiated settlement; c) the surrender option.

Of all these options, the most efficient ones are options (a) and option (c). The most important argument militating against exercising option (b) is that its execution would depend on TTP’s willingness to give up its anti-Pakistan agenda and to announce its willingness to publicly atone for its heinous crimes committed against the people of Pakistan.

There are little signs that TTP is willing to do this. Part of the problem is that TTP is an umbrella organization with many factions that are working at cross-purposes.

The hardline elements are not willing to give up their ideological goals and they are committed to inflicting maximum pain on the Pakistani state. In that pursuit, they are counting on relying on the large swath of sanctuaries provided to them by the Haqqani network, which is the controlling force in Afghanistan. The moderates, who seem willing to consider option (c) are either too weak or suffer from ambivalence about the outcome of their interim armed truce. Given these constraints, the best option for Pakistan to stay the course of fighting militancy and make it clear to the Haqqani network that they would be held directly responsible if any further terrorist attacks are carried out against the Pakistan state using Afghanistan soil.

TTP’s demand that the merger of FATA with KPK should be undone poses an existential challenge to the territorial integrity of Pakistan and therefore should be outside the pale of any negotiations with TTP.

The writer is a political scientist and defense analyst.